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Braun v. Soldier of Fortune: Tort Law
Enters the Braun's Age as Constitutional
Safeguards for Commercial Speech
Buckle 'neath the Crunch of Third-Party
Liability
Advertising is more than just a substantial source of revenue for
publications. It embodies the liberties offree speech and free press
secured to all of us so fundamentally by the First Amendment.
Yet, in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., the United
States Court of Appedls for the Eleventh Circuit recently held a
magazine liable for negligently publishing a gun-for-hire adver-
tisement that allegedly resulted in the death of plaintiffs' father.
This Casenote analyzes the detrimental, long-reaching effects of
sustaining a negligence action that penetrates so deeply into First
Amendment freedoms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars, judges, and legislators alike have filled volumes at-
tempting to define the scope of First Amendment protections of free
speech. Such an ambitious endeavor is beyond the scope of this
Casenote, however, which will focus primarily on the current safe-
guards on commercial speech and the adverse impact of a recent
appellate court case.
Until now, publishers remained relatively safe from civil liability.
Suits in defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence seldom over-
came First Amendment interests in securing unfettered expression.
In Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,1 though, an appel-
late court sustained a successful negligence action against a maga-
zine publisher brought by victims of a third-party crime.
I. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
The second part of this Note will explain the court's decision in
great detail, highlighting some of the majority's oversights along the
way. The third part discusses the recent developments in commercial
speech jurisprudence and negligence theory, and how the two inter-
relate. Part four uses First Amendment and tort law policies to op-
pose the extension of a negligence action against publishers. That
section further punctuates the weaknesses in the majority opinion by
illustrating that the merits of Braun do not support the court's deci-
sion. Finally, part five concludes that this decision sets a dangerous
precedent that threatens the very underpinnings of the First Amend-
ment itself by saddling the media with a devastating burden.
II. THE BRAUN CASE
A. The Facts of Braun
In late 1984, Bruce Gastwirth began planning the assassination of
his long-time business partner, Richard Braun. He enlisted the help
of his associate, John Horton Moore, and together they made at
least three unsuccessful attempts on Braun's life.2 Desperate, the two
men responded to a mercenary advertisement in Soldier of Fortune
Magazine (SOF) in early August 1985. The ad read: "GUN FOR
HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam
Veteran. Discreet [sic] and very private. Body guard, courier, and
other special skills. All jobs considered." 3
The "gun for hire" was Michael Savage. He had submitted the
personal service advertisement to SOF earlier that year, and the
magazine had agreed to run it for nine months. Savage testified that
when he placed the ad his only intention was to solicit legitimate
employment.4 Nonetheless, he explained that the response to his ad
was almost overwhelmingly directed at procuring his assistance in
criminal activity ranging from murder to kidnapping.5 One call in
particular caught his attention and several days later Savage met
with Gastwirth and Moore to discuss plans to murder Richard
Braun.6
2. The two men sold petroleum leases and Gastwirth allegedly owed Braun over
$250,000. Victim's Sons Win "Gun for Hire" Damages, 15 NEws MEDIA & L. 36
(1991).
3. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112 (phone number and address omitted by author).
4. Id.
5. Of the almost 40 calls Savage received per week, only one generated an offer for
legitimate work as a bodyguard. Id.
6. Id.
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SOF alleges that Savage enlisted Sean Trevor Doutre as the trig-
german and that the two men agreed to kill Braun for $5,000 each.'
On August 26, 1985, Savage, Moore, and Doutre ambushed Braun
as he and his sixteen-year-old son, Michael, were backing out of the
driveway. Doutre, armed with a MAC-11 automatic pistol, stepped
in front of Braun's car and fired multiple shots through the wind-
shield. Michael was hit in the thigh and Richard rolled out of the
car severely wounded. Before Richard could stand, Doutre ap-
proached him from behind and fired two more shots in the back of
his head, execution style.8 Richard Braun died instantly.
Michael Braun survived, however, and together with his brother
Ian, filed a diversity action against SOF in the district court, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $120,000,000
for the wrongful death of their father.9 The district court consoli-
dated this action with a separate cause of action filed by Michael
alone, seeking damages for personal injuries he suffered during the
attack. The Braun brothers contended that SOF was negligent in
publishing Savage's ad, because it created an unreasonable risk of
criminal solicitation.10
To show that SOF knew of the likelihood that criminal activity
would ensue from these kinds of personal service advertisements,
plaintiffs offered evidence of magazine and newspaper articles impli-
cating a strong connection between SOF ads and a number of crimi-
nal convictions for murder, kidnapping, assault, conspiracy, and
extortion.11 Furthermore, Braun showed that law enforcement offi-
cials had contacted SOF editors on at least two separate occasions in
connection with two multi-state criminal investigations linked to
SOF personal service ads.12 SOF president, Robert Brown, testified
that he was unaware of any such connection between his magazine's
7. Doutre's connection to Savage is unclear beyond the fact the he too was re-
sponding to Savage's personal service ad. SOF claims that Doutre was employed by Sav-
age and had executed at least two other people for him. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
8. This refers to the narrow margin of error when a gun is fired at point blank
range.
9. Complaint filed March 31, 1988, in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama. Id. at 1326. Less than one year later, Gastwirth, Savage,
Moore, and Doutre pleaded guilty to charges relating to the slaying of Richard Braun.
Supra note 2, at 37.
10. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
11. Id. "National magazines like Time and Newsweek carried some of these sto-
ries. Others were reported in local newspapers published in and around Boulder, Colo-
rado, the city in which SOF is based." Id. at 1113 n.1.
12. Id. at 1113.
classified section and criminal activity.' 3
After five days of testimony, the district court instructed the jury
that SOF was not obligated to investigate every ad it ran. Moreover,
the magazine owed "no duty to the Plaintiffs for publishing an ad if
the ad's language on its face would not convey to the reader that it
created an unreasonable risk that the advertiser, Savage, was availa-
ble to commit such violent crimes as murder.' 1 4 The court further
charged the jury that they could consider both physical and mental
anguish in determining Michael Braun's damages, but that damages
for the wrongful death claim were limited to the value of Richard
Braun's life. More importantly, punitive damages were not to be
awarded absent a showing of malice or conscious indifference by
SOF to the consequences of running the advertisement.' 5
The jury returned a verdict for the Brauns and hit SOF with over
$12,000,000 in damages, $10,000,000 of which was punitive.'0 The
district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs in accord with the
verdict and denied SOF's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. The court, however, conditioned its denial of SOF's motion
for retrial on a remittitur agreement reducing the punitive damages
award to $2,000,000.17 Plaintiffs agreed; the court entered an
amended judgment; and SOF appealed.
B. The Majority Opinion
Because of the complex First Amendment issues implicated by im-
posing civil liability on a publisher, the United States Court of Ap-
peals reviewed the Braun case de novo.' 8 The court began its two-
13. Both the former managing editor and the advertising editor who accepted Sav-
age's ad likewise denied having any knowledge of criminal activity linked to the personal
service ads. The latter further explained that she understood the term "Gun for Hire" to
mean "bodyguard or protection service-type thing," rather than "contract killer." Id.
14. The jury instructions continued:
Now, of course, the tendency to read the advertisement in question in hindsight
is hard to avoid, but it must be avoided. The test for you is not how the adver-
tisement in question reads now in light of subsequent events, but rather how
the advertisement read to a reasonable publisher at the time of publication.
You should view the facts and these instructions with particular care in this
case, in view of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which protects the
free flow of truthful and legitimate information even when it is of a commercial
rather than a political nature.
Id.
15. Id.
16. The jury awarded Michael $375,000 in compensatory damages, $10,000,000 in
punitive damages for his personal injury claim, and $2,000,000 compensatory damages to
the plaintiffs on the wrongful death claim. Id. at 1114.
17. Id. A remittitur is a judicial reduction of the amount awarded by jury.
18. Id. "[T]he Supreme Court has held that, in cases involving First Amendment
claims, an appellate court must undertake independent review of the record 'in order to
make sure that "the [trial court's] judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on
the field of free expression .... Id. at 1120 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
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part analysis with an examination of negligence claims under state
law. 9
Georgia law remains fairly conventional in its requirements for a
cause of action sounding in negligence. Plaintiff must show that de-
fendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff, that the breach was
the proximate cause of the resulting injury, and that plaintiff suf-
fered some loss or harm.20 Although the jury usually decides issues
of breach, causation, and damages, "the existence of a legal duty
presents a threshold question of law for the court."21 Georgia law
recognizes a "general duty one owes to all the world not to subject
them to an unreasonable risk of harm. ' 22 The appellate court re-
jected SOF's arguments to the contrary and reduced appellant's le-
gal position to a balancing test.23
The court, therefore, focused on the reasonability of the alleged
risk posed by SOF in publishing Savage's personal service ad. Em-
ploying a Learned Hand analysis, the court weighed the gravity and
probability of the harm against the burden on the defendant in
avoiding such risk.24 Rejecting SOF's contention that the lower
U.S. 254, 285 (1964)).
19. Though adjudicating a federal suit, the "district court, sitting in Alabama,
properly looked to Georgia law in resolving" plaintiffs' negligence claims. Id. at 1114.
"'[I]n diversity cases the federal courts must follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in
the states in which they sit."' Id. (quoting Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487, 494 (1941)). Thus, because both the murder and Michael's injuries occurred in
Georgia, "Alabama conflict of laws rules required that the district court apply Georgia
law." Id.
20. The appellate court noted:
To prevail in an action for negligence in Georgia, a party must establish the
following elements: 1) A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised
by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; 2) a
breach of this standard; 3) a legally attributable causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury; and 4) some loss or damage flowing to the
plaintiff's legally protected interest as a result of the alleged breach of the legal
duty.
Id.
21. Id. (citing First Fed. Say. Bank of Brunswick v. Fretthold, 394 S.E.2d 128,
131 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)).
22. Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga. 1982) (citation
omitted).
23. The court stated: "We believe, however, that the crux of SOF's argument is
not that it had no duty to the public, but that, as a matter of law, the risk to the public
presented when a publisher prints an advertisement is 'unreasonable' only if the ad
openly solicits criminal activity." Braun, 968 F.2d at 1114-15 (citing SOF's Reply Brief
at 24). The court cited several Georgia cases supporting the use of a balancing test to
determine whether or not the risk posed by an individual's actions is "unreasonable." Id.
at 1115.
24. "Simply put, liability depends upon whether the burden on the defendant of
adopting adequate precautions is less than the probability of harm from the defendant's
court's jury instructions placed an intolerable burden upon the press,
the appellate court reasoned that "the duty of care the district court
imposed on publishers was an appropriate reconciliation of" the
state's interest in providing compensation for tort victims and First
Amendment interests in safeguarding free speech.25
SOF relied primarily on its successful defense of a nearly identical
negligence claim filed in the Fifth Circuit, Eimann v..Soldier of For-
tune Magazine, Inc.26 In that case, plaintiffs, the son and mother of
Sandra Black, brought suit against SOF for negligently publishing a
similar personal service advertisement through which John Wayne
Hearn was contracted to kill Sandra for $10,000.7 The "hit" was
successful, and Sandra's husband, who answered the ad, paid Hearn.
The jury in Eimann was instructed to hold SOF liable if: "1) the
relation to illegal activity appears on the ad's face; or 2) 'the adver-
tisement, embroidered by its context, would lead a reasonable pub-
lisher of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances
to conclude that the advertisement could reasonably be interpreted'
as an offer to commit crimes."28 Plaintiffs won the verdict and were
awarded $9,400,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
The appellate court reversed the jury verdict, however, and re-
fused to saddle SOF with such an onerous burden. The unanimous
court postulated that imposing liability on SOF whenever the adver-
tisement "could reasonably be interpreted as an offer to engage in
illegal activity" would require the magazine to refuse all ambiguous
ads.2 Such a sweeping effect clearly touches on the fringes of First
Amendment safeguards, especially in the absence of any bright-line
standard. 30 Rather than decide the case on constitutional grounds,
however, the Eimann court rested its reversal on SOF's lack of duty
as a matter of state law.31 Given the ambiguity of Hearn's ad and
unmodified conduct multiplied by the gravity of the injury that might result from the
defendant's unmodified conduct." Id. (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947)) (a case that provided the genesis for Judge Learned
Hand's oft-cited balancing test).
25. Id. For jury instructions given in Braun, see supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
26. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
27. Hearn's ad read:
EX-MARINES---67-69 'Nam Vets, Ex-DI [drill instructor], weapons specialist - jun-
gle warfare, pilot, M.E. [multi-engine planes], high-risk assignments, U.S. or overseas,
Id. at 831 (phone number omitted).
28. Id. at 833 (quoting District Court jury instructions).
29. Id. at 837 (applying similar balancing test under Texas tort law).
30. The court was particularly concerned with the potential compromise of consti-
tutional protections for commercial speech: "[I]n the constitutional arena we have noted
that the [mere] possibility of illegal results does not necessarily strip an ad of its com-
mercial speech protection." Id. at 837. However, because the appellate court failed to
find a legal duty owed to plaintiffs, it did not feel compelled to address the First Amend-
ment issues directly. Id. at 833.
31. "We conclude that no liability can attach under these principles as a matter of
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the "pervasiveness of advertising in our society,"32 the magazine's
burden to investigate each ad was simply too onerous to be out-
weighed by the speculative risk of harm involved. The court, there-
fore, refused to hold SOF liable.
Though Braun seems remarkably similar to Eimann in both scope
and analysis, the Braun court distinguished its case on two grounds.
First, the jury instructions used in Eimann failed to balance ade-
quately the risks and burdens related to defendant' conduct. The
jury in that case was permitted to impose liability when the adver-
tisement could reasonably be interpreted as criminal solicitation.
Even ambiguous ads are susceptible to "reasonable" interpretations
of criminal solicitation and, therefore, liability could be visited upon
a publisher who runs a facially innocuous advertisement in good
faith.3" Furthermore, even absent a facial examination of the ad, the
jury could have held SOF liable "if a reasonably prudent publisher
would discover the connection to crime through the investigation of
the advertisement's 'context."'34
By contrast, the Braun instructions explicitly limited the jury's in-
quiry to a facial interpretation of the ad, thus avoiding an uncertain
and burdensome plunge into contextual analysis of the magazine's
nature, readership, and knowledge of past criminal links.35 More-
over, unlike the language used in the Eimann charge, the Braun in-
structions mandated that the unreasonable risk created be "clearly
identifiable" so as to avoid imposing liability for publication of
merely ambiguous advertisements.3 6
The appellate court also addressed a second distinction. While
Hearn's ad was "facially innocuous" and "ambiguous in its mes-
sage," the Savage advertisement "clearly conveyed that the adver-
tiser was 'ready, willing and able' to use his gun to commit other
law. SOF owed no duty to refrain from publishing a facially innocuous classified adver-
tisement when the ad's context-at most-made its message ambiguous." Id.
32. Id. at 836.
33. Id. at 833.
34. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1116 (11th Cir.
1992) (citing Eimann, 880 F.2d at 833).
35. These factors weighed into the second prong of the Eimann jury instructions.
Eimann, 880 F.2d at 833.
36. As the appellate court explains:
We are convinced that the district court's use of phrases like 'clear and present
danger' and 'clearly identifiable unreasonable risk' properly conveyed to the
jury that it could not impose liability on SOF if Savage's ad posed only an
unclear or insubstantial risk of harm to the public and if SOF would bear a
disproportionately heavy burden in avoiding this risk.
Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116.
crimes." 3 The appellate court reasoned, therefore, that the unrea-
sonable risk created by Savage's advertisement was more "clearly
identifiable." Thus, the court justified imposing liability in Braun
though recognizing that a similar imposition in Eimann would have
saddled SOF with too onerous a burden.3
8
The second part of the appellate court's analysis of Braun focused
on the delicate First Amendment issues involved with imposing lia-
bility on the media. Reviewing the principles espoused in the
landmark case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Cit-
izens Consumer Council,39 the court recognized that "the First
Amendment [even] protects speech that, like Savage's ad, 'does no
more than propose a commercial transaction."'40
The threat of large damage awards could lead a publisher not to
print a completely harmless ad unless he was reasonably certain that
no jury could interpret the advertisement as an offer to commit crim-
inal acts. Such self-imposed restraint "would compromise the First
Amendment interest in commercial speech by depriving protected
speech 'of a legitimate and recognized avenue of access to the
public.' ' 41
Despite the grave constitutional concerns that seem to follow any
imposition of liability for printing commercial speech, however, the
Braun court seemed to assuage these concerns with an open-arm ac-
ceptance of a "modified" negligence standard.42 This new standard
coupled the old negligence standard with that part of the jury in-
struction that limited the scope of defendant's duty to a facial exam-
ination of the advertisement. The absence of language in the jury
instructions suggesting that SOF investigate the ad purportedly
served the tantamount function of ensuring that any finding of liabil-
ity would not create a chilling effect on protected speech. 43 In less
than two pages of the court's opinion, therefore, the constitutional
issues at the forefront of the case were semantically put to rest.
The court quickly rejected the remainder of SOF's contentions.
37. Id. at 1116 n.3 (quoting Brief for Respondents [the Brauns] at 27).
38. Id. at 1116.
39. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
40. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762).
41. Id. (quoting Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 493 (1962)). For a
more detailed analysis of the protection extended to commercial speech, see infra part
III.A.
42. Id. at 1118. See discussion infra part III.
43. The following jury instructions were given:
The absence of a duty requiring publishers to investigate the advertisements
they print and the requirement that the substance of the ad itself must warn
the publisher of a substantial danger of harm to the public guarantee that the
burden placed on publishers will not impermissibly chill protected commercial
speech.
Id. at 1119.
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SOF argued that imposing liability would force the magazine out of
business and thereby "chill" all protected speech contained within
the magazine. This contention, though provocative, was dismissed in
a footnote.44 SOF also argued that the intervention of Gastwirth,
Moore, Savage, and Doutre severed the causal link between the ad's
publication and Braun's death; the resulting harm was both unfore-
seeable and "too remote in the chain of events . .. to hold SOF
liable. ' 45 Under a more deferential standard of review, however, the
appellate court found "that the jury had ample grounds for finding
• ..proximate cause" because third party intervention does not
sever the causal link when that intervention was "a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of the defendant's conduct. 46
The opinion further concluded that under the "modified" negli-
gence test, Savage's ad clearly presented an identifiable unreasonable
risk.47 SOF, therefore, had a legal duty to refrain from publishing
the personal service advertisement. Consequently, SOF was held lia-
ble for the death of Richard Braun.48
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Senior Circuit Judge Eschbach cast a brief, but telling, dissent.
Though applauding the majority's "imaginative interpretation of
scant precedent," he refused to "uphold the crushing third-party lia-
bility the jury ha[d] imposed on Soldier of Fortune Magazine.14 9 He
based his misgivings on the ambiguity of both the jury instructions
44. "[W]e observe that the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the notion that
the First Amendment interest in protected speech requires that 'publishers and broad-
casters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from [tort] liability."' Id. at
1119 n.8 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)).
45. Id. at 1121. Because causation is an issue of fact, de novo review was inappro-
priate here and the court employed the "traditional standard of deference to the fact
finder." Id.
46. Id. at 1122 (quoting Rosinek v. Cox Enters., Inc., 305 S.E.2d 393, 394-95 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1983)).
47. After attaching great importance to the different kinds of typeface used in the
ad and emphasizing certain key words like "other," the court stated that:
[T]he ad's combination of sinister terms makes it apparent that there was a
substantial danger of harm to the public. The ad expressly solicits all jobs re-
quiring the use of a gun. When the list of legitimate jobs-i.e., body guard and
courier-is followed by 'other special skills,' and 'all jobs considered,' the im-
plication is clear that the advertiser would consider illegal jobs.
Id. at 1121.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1122 (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
and Savage's advertisement. Realizing that juries may not be in-
clined or able to appreciate the "safeguards" that the modified negli-
gence test purportedly afforded the appellant, Eschbach would have
reversed the lower court. To Judge Eschbach, even assuming the
constitutionality of the modified negligence standard, the ad still fell
short of criminal solicitation. 50
III. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Brief Overview
Commercial speech is "expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience." 51 Until fairly recently,
such expression fell well beyond the scope of First Amendment pro-
tection. 2 In 1976, though, the Supreme Court began to forge a long
path towards a broader interpretation of free speech. In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, the majority held that truthful advertis-
ing of a legal product or service deserved some degree of First
Amendment protection. 53 In subjecting Virginia's anti-advertising
statute to heightened scrutiny, several policies supporting commer-
cial protection emerged." The Court explained that consumers have
a "strong interest in the free flow of commercial information."r'
Therefore, the state is not to decide selectively which advertisements
are in the best interests of the public. In fact, "[i]t is precisely this
50. "I remain convinced that the language of the advertisement is ambiguous,
rather than patently criminal as the majority believes." Id.
51. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
52. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Though the First
Amendment limits the state's power to regulate core speech, "the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54. In
such cases courts normally applied minimal scrutiny. Under this deferential standard, the
regulation survived review if the court could construct any conceivable basis for the
statute.
53. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762. At issue was the constitutionality of a
state regulation prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices, The
state feared that such publicity would lead to deceptive advertising and foster drug
abuse.
54. Id. at 770. Heightened scrutiny involves an intermediate level of analysis
whereby the Court weighs the state's interests against those adversely effected by the
regulation. Thus, the statute must substantially advance a legitimate government objec-
tive without overreaching into more securely protected interests (i.e., political
expression).
55. Id. at 764. In recognizing a consumer's constitutional right to receive informa-
tion, the Court continued:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation
of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private eco-
nomic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of com-
mercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
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kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and
the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us."5 6
Commercial speech was not afforded absolute protection, however,
and still sits somewhat lower in the constitutional hierarchy than po-
litical speech.57 The Court justified this secondary level of protection
on policy grounds. Arguably, commercial speech, by its very nature,
is both hardier and more verifiable than political speech.58 An adver-
tiser presumably has a greater pecuniary incentive to risk tort liabil-
ity than a spokesperson for a nonprofit political rights group for
example. 9 The economic motivation to advertise, therefore, miti-
gates the potential chilling effect feared by First Amendment
absolutists.
Though the Court developed a useful rubric for commercial
speech analysis, one must remember that Virginia State Board and
its progeny involved state regulation that functioned as a prior-re-
straint on commercial expression; that is, some forms of commercial
speech were completely forbidden. However, because Braun in-
volved, not an attempt to enjoin expression, but a claim by private
individuals for the consequences of speech already expressed, the
emphasis shifts from content regulation to legal duty. 0 That transi-
tion takes form in the following sections.
56. Id. at 770. "Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it
wishes of its pharmacies .... But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance
of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering." Id.
57. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), where the Supreme
Court also noted that:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncom-
mercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the
force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.
Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead
have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensu-
rate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while
allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of non-
commercial expression.
Id. at 456.
58. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
59. See Lisa F. Firenze, Publishers' Liability for Commercial Advertisements:
Testing the Limits of the First Amendment, 23 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 137 (1990).
"[C]ommercial speech is essentially tied to economic profits. Consequently, there is less
probability that commercial speech restrictions will deter commercial speakers ... from
asserting first amendment rights." Id. at 148 (citing Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771
n.24).
60. See, e.g., Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397
(W.D. Ark. 1987), in which the court recognized that the plaintiff "is not attempting to
have defendant enjoined from exercising its right to run advertisements such as those in
B. The Constitutional Hurdle to Negligence Claims
In addition to the staggering precedent militating against impos-
ing tort liability on media defendants, 61 First Amendment safe-
guards on free expression likewise present a formidable impasse. The
Supreme Court has decided that the First Amendment does not
shield commercial speech to the same degree as political speech. 62
Many of the policies underlying the importance of unhindered politi-
cal expression, however, similarly support a protective view of com-
mercial speech.
1. First Amendment Objectives
Unlike most constitutional provisions, the First Amendment
speaks in simple, straightforward, and absolute terms: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . 6 This mandate commands legislative noninterference
and the United States Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment's initial and paramount purpose was to prevent govern-
ment from imposing prior-restraints on free expression. 4 Though the
First Amendment's scope is not as limitless as a literal reading
would imply, the judiciary has been careful to afford speech a degree
of protection commensurate with the vital function it serves in our
society.6 5
The First Amendment fosters a free flow exchange of information
in the open marketplace of ideas.66 The veracity of an idea is tested
question. Instead, he is simply asking that a jury, after a trial, award him damages for
the consequences of those advertisements." Id. at 1400.
61. See infra note 91.
62. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
63. U.S. Const. amend. I. Compare, e.g., the First Amendment with the Fourth
Amendment's protection of "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const.
amend. IV (emphasis added) and the Fifth Amendment safeguard against deprivations
of life, liberty, or property without "due process." U.S. Const. amend. V (emphasis
added). The language used in these amendments, and others, clearly qualifies these rights
with procedural limitations, thus denying them the sense of absoluteness that resounds in
the terms of the First Amendment.
For an excellent discussion and illustration of the development of First Amendment
jurisprudence, see William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause,
70 CAL. L. REV. 107 (1987).
64. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 100 (1979); Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
The First Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (express incorporation of First into
Fourteenth Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (dictum)
(Fourteenth Amendment extends freedom of speech safeguards to state legislation).
65. The Supreme Court has characterized the freedom of speech as, "the indispen-
sable condition . . . of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
66. This rationale originated in the landmark dissent by Justice Holmes in Abrams
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by competition with conflicting ideas, unhindered in their expression.
To this end, the media's function is invaluable. In Pittman v. Dow
Jones & Co., Inc.,67 the court expressed this notion succinctly: "The
attitude of courts towards newspapers of general circulation may be
fairly characterized as one of somewhat understandable protection-
ism because of the widespread judicial perception of the necessity to
preserve the free flow of information to the public by way of the
media."68
The unencumbered sharing of ideas requires a neutral forum, pro-
tected from the prospect of government regulation or overwhelming
civil liability. 9 Such a threat produces the very "chilling effect" the
First Amendment was designed to enjoin.7 0 In the advertising busi-
ness, the uncertainty of civil suits and financial impracticability of
investigating every sponsor might force a prospective publisher to re-
fuse an advertisement for fear of a jury potentially finding the ad
criminal on its face. "This would deprive such materials, which
might otherwise be entitled to constitutional protection, of a legiti-
mate and recognized avenue of access to the public." 71 Furthermore,
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
67. 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La. 1987).
68. Id. at 922; see also JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed.
1986):
[T]hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so
truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to mis-
doubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; whoever knew truth put to
the worse in a free and open encounter?
Id. at 835 (quoting John Milton); see also United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) where J. Hand explains that:
The dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as many
different facets and colors as is possible . . . is closely akin to, if indeed it is
not the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be folly; but we have staked upon it our all.
Id.
69. Realizing this possibility even in the commercial speech context, the Pittman
court reasoned that "[in weighing private and public considerations . . . the public pol-
icy of not subjecting newspapers to the chilling prospect of hordes of suits by disgruntled
readers of inaccurate ads dominates." Pittman, 662 F. Supp. at 923; see also Blasi, To-
ward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11 (1981).
"Speakers, listeners and society at large all suffer when the peculiar features of a ...
scheme have a 'chilling effect' on persons that causes them to forego protected expression
rather than get themselves enmeshed in the scheme." Id. at 24.
70. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
71. Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 493 (1962); see also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The threat of civil judgments tends to force
individuals to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone."' Id. at 279 (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1962)).
at least one commentator speculates that fear of liability could ex-
tend to publication of seemingly innocuous advertisements of "items
for sale" that later turn out to be stolen, or to "singles" ads that
result in sexual assaults or the transmission of AIDS.72
Freedom of speech enjoys a particularly salient role in a system of
self-government. 73 To the extent that the media serve a watch-dog
function, searching for corruption within the political system, the
First Amendment necessarily "shields those who would censure the
state or expose its abuses. 7 4 Objective scrutiny requires indepen-
dence from the very bureaucratic entity that might otherwise engage
in selective distribution of "suitable" information.7 5 Therefore, the
First Amendment encourages tenacious investigation by a largely
self-governing institution.7
Lastly, expression serves as a public release mechanism. An open
forum diffuses the need for violent displays of civil unrest. From an
historical standpoint, the United States Supreme Court noted that,
"the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances . . . . [In the past] men feared witches and burnt
women."77 If courts begin to impose liability on the media, however,
one more outlet is closed off, thereby turning the masses towards less
peaceful means of expression.
2. Application to Commercial Speech
The Court's decision to subordinate commercial speech in the
First Amendment hierarchy of protected speech might lead one to
contend that the persuasiveness of these policies lies inextricably
72. Thomas C. Kates, Publisher Liability for "Gun for Hire" Advertisements: Re-
sponsible Exercise of Free Speech or Self-Censorship?, 35 VAYNE L. REV. 1203, 1215-
16 (1989).
AIDS is the acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, the lethal virus
most commonly communicated through sexual contact.
73. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Free
speech has a "structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of
self-government."); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (free
speech is the quintessence of self-government).
74. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 185 (1979).
75. As Justice Black noted in one of his more epic concurrences:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protec-
tion it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press [is] to
serve the governed, not the governors .... The press [is] protected so that it
[can] bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and
unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
76. "So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it
knows, and may seek to learn what it can." Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
77. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927); see also Milk Wagon
Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941)
(freedom to speak diffuses "force and explosions").
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bound to the value of political expression itself.78 When the equation
is altered slightly, and we consider commercial speech instead of po-
litical speech in the First Amendment arena, the protection of free
expression arguably takes on less importance. To the extent that the
future of our democratic livelihood rarely teeters on the ideological
contributions of advertisements and want ads, the dangers of censor-
ship and civil unrest would appear overstated.
The distinctions between commercial and core speech, however,
suffer from ambiguity, contradiction, and a rather astounding lack of
support.7 9 As one commentator notes, "[reliance on hardiness and
verifiability to justify disparate constitutional standing is unsatisfac-
tory" because such rationales both underestimate the resiliency of
political speech and overstate the ease of authenticating deceptive
advertising. 0 Moreover, these rationales find even less tenable appli-
cation in the publication context, where one author astutely notes:
Publishers do not tout their own products or services, but rather present
information regarding the offerings of third parties. Newspapers and
magazines, therefore, have a far smaller financial interest than advertisers
in the advancement of any one particular product or service. Furthermore,
publishers do not have easy access to the facts pertaining to advertisements
nor do they have the resources to screen each and every advertisement. Un-
like advertisers, publishers often must determine the intent'of speech under
the pressure of publication deadlines. As a result of these differences, pub-
lishers are usually more vulnerable than advertisers to the chilling effects of
commercial speech regulations. 1
78. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
79. "The differences between commercial and other forms of speech relied on to
limit constitutional protection of commercial speech are neither convincing nor satisfy-
ing." Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with
an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289, 299 (1987). The author advocates that the
Court "refrain from translating perceived practical differences between commercial and
political speech into constitutional distinctions." Id. at 309. See also In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) (noting that the line between commercial and non-commercial
speech is not always clear and may be "based in part on the motive of the speaker and
the character of the expressive activity").
80. Lively, supra note 79, at 296. The author continues:
Although the profit motive is often a persistent impetus for commercial speech,
the desire to be elected is a potent motivating force for political expression. If
First Amendment status hinges on resiliency, campaign rhetoric should be af-
forded diminished protection. The hardiness rationale thus fails to draw a satis-
factory distinction between commercial and other types of speech.
Id.
81. Firenze, supra note 59, at 149. The author also advocates greater protection
for publishers of commercial speech based on her contention that the right to free press
carries with it even more staunch First Amendment protections for the media:
The free press interest strongly suggests that publishers of advertisements
placed by third parties should be afforded a greater degree of constitutional
protection than actual advertisers. First, the press is the only institution
Given the questionable propriety of such an artificial and unper-
suasive distinction, particularly in the context of third-party adver-
tisements, arguments attempting to diminish the inherent value of
commercial speech in our society carry little weight. Protected
speech is protected speech, and the policies underlying the preserva-
tion of political expression are equally compelling in the commercial
speech context. In Virginia Board, the Court went to great lengths
to espouse this view by paralleling the open economic market with
the open market of ideas. Thus, even in commercial advertising,
"people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them. ' 2
IV. ANALYSIS
A. First Amendment Policies Do Not Support Imposing Liability
on Publishers Like SOF
Braun creates a dangerous precedent. A negligence standard low-
ers constitutional restrictions on states by allowing them to curtail
free expression via heightened civil liability. As the United States
Supreme Court noted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,83 "What
a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal
statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law," because the
"fear of damage awards. . . may be markedly more inhibiting than
the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute. '84 That phrase
shoulders promethean import, as it carries constitutional safeguards
against regulation of commercial speech into tort law.
Analogizing to the Braun case, the First Amendment under Sulli-
van would not allow the state to establish a negligence standard for
granted a specific constitutional right by the Bill of Rights. Second, the press,
unlike any other social institution, provides the means for the exchange of ideas
and opinions necessary to make informed decisions in a democratic society.
Consequently, the publishing industry holds a privileged position in the Ameri-
can constitutional scheme.
Id. at 139.
82. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
83. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
84. Id. at 277. The Court considered the permissibility of a per se libel law requir-
ing defendant to establish the truth of the offending statements. Plaintiff was a police
chief implicated in a disparaging article about police brutality. Reasoning that First
Amendment interests require a showing of malice or reckless indifference in order to
recover damages, the Court emphasized the societal importance of being able to criticize
the government and public officials with relative impunity. First Amendment protection
thus stirs political debate of public concern by shielding those who criticize government
officials in good faith. Alabama's libel laws placed the onerous burden of disproving fal-
sity on the defendant and were thus clearly inconsistent with First Amendment
objectives.
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publishers of commercial speech if the state itself could not permissi-
bly regulate such speech under a comparable criminal standard. For
example, suppose the Georgia legislature were to enact a statute
under current law forbidding publishers to run advertisements for
services that appear to solicit criminal activity on their face. Pub-
lisher prints a "gun for hire" ad and is prosecuted by the state for
violation of the preceding statute. Publisher challenges the constitu-
tionality of the law as a direct infringement of First Amendment
rights. Under the modified Central Hudson test, the state would
likely face an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny.85
First, the court would make a threshold determination of the ad-
vertisement's legality and truthfulness, because commercial speech
only enjoys any degree of First Amendment protection if it "con-
cern[s] lawful activity and [is] not . ..misleading."86 A facial ex-
amination of a hired gun ad may spawn ambiguous interpretations
which, though perhaps inviting curiosity, hardly rise to the level of
falsehood or illegality. In such instance, the court would proceed to
an ad hoc analysis of the state's objectives in regulating the adver-
tisements. Public safety certainly qualifies as a substantial govern-
ment interest. Prohibiting explicit offers to engage in criminal
conduct directly advances that interest by discouraging proliferation
of such offers. However, the state may be hard pressed to convince
the court that the statute is narrowly tailored such that it provides a
"reasonable" fit to further such objectives.8 7 Though the law need
85. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). In striking down a regulation prohibiting all promotional advertisements in-
tended to stimulate the purchase of utility services, the majority expressed concern over
the legislature's intrusion into First Amendment matters. However, the Court also recog-
nized that the state could regulate the content of commercial speech, even truthful and
legitimate advertising, if the statute was tightly drawn. The First Amendment would
permit a regulation that directly advanced a substantial state interest as long as the
adverse impact on other protected speech remained minimal. Thus, the four part test
espoused in Central Hudson qualified the amount of constitutional protection extended to
commercial speech. The oft-cited test developed in that case requires the Court to
determine:
[W]hether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commer-
cial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activ-
ity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest as-




87. First Amendment analysis frequently involves an examination of the means
used to achieve the state's desired objective. The tighter the "fit" between the two, the
not be the least restrictive means of achieving the state's goal, when
the prohibitive effect of the statute begins to threaten fully protected
expression as well, then the interests in preserving free speech may
outweigh the state's interest in public safety, in which case the stat-
ute will likely be struck down.88 This could occur if, in the above
example, other publishers refrained from running any personal ser-
vice ads at all (or in borderline cases), for fear of later falling victim
to criminal prosecution. The resulting chilling effect constitutes one
of the gravest possible assaults on the First Amendment.89
Moreover, the interlocking policies underlying free speech support
an especially hostile defense to what effectively amounts to statutory
censorship. Other alternatives to publisher liability surely exist. If
the state could achieve its safety objectives by tightening gun control
laws, increasing prison sentences for violent crimes, or even redefin-
ing the advertiser's duty, then perhaps a more sensible balance
would be struck between the state's interest in public safety and
First Amendment interests in the indispensable free flow of
information.
The notion that courts would support such a statutory measure in
the presence of more carefully tailored alternatives that could
achieve the same goal without chilling the press is difficult to believe.
By virtue of the Sullivan axiom stated earlier, therefore, the courts
should be equally unwilling to sustain a negligence claim grounded
in terms equivalent to those in the state's criminal statute.9 0 To hold
otherwise would be to allow the state to achieve indirectly through
tort law what it could not achieve directly through regulation. In-
deed, the great majority of courts have reached the same conclusion
and have denied such civil claims. 1
less likely the regulation will interfere with other protected speech.
88. The least restrictive means prong of the Central Hudson test was later elimi-
nated in Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). Thus,
current law in this area merely dictates that the means be "narrowly tailored" to serve
the government objective. Id. at 478.
89. As one author notes, negligence claims in particular are even more likely than
other tort cases to cause a chilling effect "because even publishers who verify the accu-
racy of advertisements cannot fully ensure freedom from liability." Firenze, supra note
59, at 168. This is especially true in the Einann case where the court itself commented
that "even if SOF had investigated Hearn [the advertiser] and his partner . . . it would
have discovered. . . no false information that might have aroused suspicion." Eimann v.
Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir. 1989).
90. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
91. See e.g., Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp 921 (E.D. La. 1987) (no
duty to investigate accuracy of investment advertisements absent the magazine's overt
guarantee as to their soundness; thus the court adopted a recklessness standard); Walters
v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1987)(financial
burden to test and insure against advertised products too great to hold defendant liable
for injuries to plaintiff resulting from use of advertised tampons even though advertise-
ment appeared textually next to several pages of related subject matter); Yuhas v.
Mudge, 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (magazine under no obligation
[VOL. 30: 957. 1993] Braun v. Soldier of Fortune
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Extending a cause of action in negligence against publishers like
SOF places a constitutionally impermissible burden on media de-
fendants. Such infringement flies in the face of First Amendment
safeguards that ensure the vitality of a free press and secure the ben-
efits of that vitality.
B. Tort Law Policies Do Not Support Imposing Liability on
Publishers Like SOF
Negligence arises when conduct falls below a particular standard
of care established to protect others from exposure to unreasonable
risks of harm.92 A successful claim sounding in negligence generally
requires plaintiff to prove duty, breach, causation, and damages.
Negligence cannot attach to conduct where no duty exists.9 Duty
itself is a personal obligation imposed by law. Its existence is deter-
mined judicially from a calculus of policy considerations:
among them, the social consensus that the interest is worthy of protection;
the foreseeability of harm and the degree of certainty that the protectedperson suffered injury; moral blame society attaches to the conduct; the pre-
vention of future harm; considerations of cost and ability to spread the risk
of loss; the economic burden upon the actor and the community - and
others.9 4
Breach results when the actor's conduct falls below the standard
to investigate or test inherently dangerous products advertised within); Suarez v. Under-
wood, 426 N.Y.S.2d 208 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (no liability absent showing of malice,
intent, or reckless disregard for plaintiff's harm resulting from use of dangerous hair
transplant process advertised in a magazine which also reported on the dangers of such
transplants); Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978) ("The news media, for the most part, is merely the conduit for the speech of the
advertiser and, therefore, will not be held liable for the publication of advertising which
is false or misleading, unless actual malice is shown."); Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490
N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ohio 1986) ("[C]ompeting public policy and constitutional concerns
tilt decidedly in favor of the press when mere negligence is alleged.").
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965); see also W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 1-7 (5th ed. 1984).
93. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, 145 (4th ed.
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
94. Hyde v. Columbia Daily Tribune, 637 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
in redressing individual injury, one author suggests that several policy considerations in-
fluence the imposition of liability: "Assessing fault, deterring future wrongdoing when
possible, providing clear standards of conduct, shifting loss to the one best able to bear it,
and avoiding the disrupting effects of self-help all are policy considerations that have
combined to produce current negligence law." Gerald R. Smith, Media Liability for
Physical Injury Resulting from the Negligent Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1193,
1219 n.147 (1988) (providing an excellent analysis of negligence theory as applied to
First Amendment issues).
imposed and creates an unreasonable risk to others. The un-
reasonability of the ensuing risk presents one of the thorniest issues
for the court and generally involves an application of Justice Hand's
balancing test that was discussed earlier.95
Causation consists of two parts, cause in fact and proximate cause.
While the former generally involves a "but-for" calculus, the latter
qualifies the scope of the actor's liability on practical or policy
grounds. 96 Thus, when plaintiff proves that his compensable injuries
were proximately caused by defendant's breach of a duty owed to
plaintiff, a viable negligence claim will lie. Notwithstanding a suc-
cessful showing of all four elements, however, courts have proven re-
luctant to impose liability on media defendants for a myriad of
policy concerns.17
The young plaintiffs in Braun stir tremendous sympathy; the
death of their father was tragic, brutal, and unforgivable. Though
they may deserve some form of compensation for their loss, however,
the above policies do not justify the crushing liability that the appel-
late court imposed on SOF.
Imposing a duty on publishers to refrain from publishing adver-
tisements that can be facially construed as posing an unreasonable
risk of harm presumably serves the state's interest in public safety.
The constitutional defects in achieving such an objective through tort
law remain clearly stated in the previous section."8 More impor-
tantly, though, is that the very purpose of negligence law is ill-served
by imposing liability on publishers.
Applying the enumerated calculus of policy considerations 9 to the
facts of Braun, two main social objectives emerge: 1) spreading vic-
tims' losses through compensation; and 2) preventing future harm of
a similar nature by using damage awards to deter publishers like
SOF from publishing ads that allegedly solicit criminal behavior.
Once again, the two sons of the murder victim certainly deserve
compensation, but shifting their loss to the publisher, absent a higher
degree of fault, seems little more than an inequitable exercise in
deep pocket litigation, attaching liability to whoever has the most
money. If an action in negligence incorporates such fiscal targeting
95. If the burden on the actor in alleviating the risk does not outweigh the magni-
tude and probability of the harm occurring, the court finds that the actor has breached
his duty to those harmed. "A risk becomes unreasonable when its magnitude outweighs
the social utility of the act or omission that creates it." Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 835 (5th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965); see supra note 24.
96. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (public
policy militates against endless liability for events racing beyond a foreseeable point).
97. See supra note 91.
98. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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as a matter of law, then the media become little more than involun-
tary insurers of every one of their readers and their readers' victims.
Such logic stems from the basic fact that, among several individ-
ual parties, a magazine or newspaper, inevitably tied to a corporate
entity, will almost always have access to greater financial resources
than individual plaintiffs. A corporate conglomerate sitting opposite
two small boys in a courtroom probably appears an easy target for
an emotionally-swayed jury charged with assessing liability. Yet
SOF, in choosing to publish a magazine for military enthusiasts, cer-
tainly had no intention of placing its bankroll behind every sub-
scriber, much less behind unforeseeable third parties, in order to
insure him or her against any injuries caused by those who happen to
advertise in the same publication. Such reasoning subjects publishers
to claims by an extraordinarily large and indeterminate class of po-
tential plaintiffs who may not have any connection at all to the
magazine.100
Perhaps a more rational approach would be to recognize that com-
pensation arises out of liability, and not that liability arises out of an
ability to compensate. Clarifying that misconception insures a more
objective review of publisher conduct without the moral, social, or
psychological pressure juries may feel to insure that the sympathetic
plaintiffs receive reparations for their terrible loss. Under the guise
of spreading the losses to those who can most afford to bear them, a
negligence suit against publishers turns a conduit of indispensable
information into an insurance carrier saddled with financial burdens
well beyond its capacity.
Additionally, whatever deterrent function is served by a punitive
damage award, the subsequent risks to all forms of protected speech,
and the disproportionate impact on publishers, clearly outweigh the
safety incentives supposedly furthered. Put simply, imposing civil lia-
bility constitutes overkill of the severest kind. Though the purpose of
allowing a modified negligence claim may be limited to discouraging
100. "For the law to permit such exposure to those in the publishing business who
in good faith accept paid advertisements for a myriad of products would open the doors
'to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class."' Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (quoting
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)); but see
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155-56 (1951) (rejecting defendant's
contention that large civil suits would bankrupt the journal: imposing a negligence stan-
dard of care only "applies to a publisher what the law applies to others"). Such a sweep-
ing justification, however, fails to account for the special role the press plays in our
society as recognized by the First Amendment. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying
text.
the publication of only facially criminal advertisements, the result
may not be so limited. As a California appellate court recognized,
the threat of civil judgments, "along with skyrocketing insurance
rates, would deter many magazines from accepting advertising, has-
tening their demise from lack of revenue. Others would comply, but
raise their prices beyond the reach of the average reader . . . .Soon
the total number of publications in circulation would drop
dramatically."1 o
The Braun court attempted to distinguish its decision from Wal-
ters v. Seventeen Magazine, and other similar cases, by merely re-
quiring SOF to examine the ads facially, instead of investigating
each one in detail.102 As several commentators have pointed out,
though, "even requiring publishers to screen advertisements which
contain facially apparent violations involves the media in an overly
burdensome law enforcement task because of the practical difficulty
of statutory interpretation in determining mixed questions of law and
fact." 3 A "mere" facial examination, therefore, cannot sufficiently
mitigate the burden on the publisher who, under the guise of public
safety, may be forced to shut down completely due to lost revenues
and multi-million dollar damage awards. The censuring effect on
both commercial and core speech in light of such a shut down carries
the dreaded chilling effect to the absolute extreme: closing the chan-
nels of communication completely.1 04 Thus the safety objective,
though legitimate, is ill-conceived as grounds for a tort action and
butts hard against First Amendment safeguards.
C. Braun Decision Shaky on the Merits
Even assuming, arguendo, that a justifiable negligence action lies
here for victims of third party crimes, the facts of Braun did not
support a judgment for plaintiffs on the merits. In employing a risk-
utility analysis under Georgia law, the court failed to strike a proper
balance between "the burden on the defendant of adopting adequate
precautions" and "the probability of harm from defendant's unmodi-
fied conduct multiplied by the gravity of the injury that might result
from the defendant's unmodified conduct."'' 05 In fact, the entire
101. Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1122, 241 Cal. Rptr.
101, 103 (1987) (no publisher liability where teenage girl injured by tampon after read-
ing magazine's ad for the product).
102. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text; Braun v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1119 (11th Cir. 1992).
103. Firenze, supra note 59, at 161 n.160 (citing Hunter, Prescription Drugs and
Open Housing: More on Commercial Speech, 25 EMORY L.J. 815, 837-48 (1976)).
104. "[A] newspaper can be silenced as easily by cutting off its source of funds, as
it can be by enjoining its publication." United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th
Cir. 1972).
105. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1115 (11th Cir.
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analysis consisted of little more than unpersuasive attempts to distin-
guish Eimann, upon which appellant relied. 10
Distinguishing Eimann solely on a difference in jury instructions,
the court placed great weight on the alleviated burden that a mere
facial examination, as opposed to an arduous investigation, purport-
edly entails. Thus, the majority argued, because the jury could not
impose liability where the unreasonable risk of harm would only
have been foreseeable after careful investigation, the burden on de-
fendant remained minimal. 10 7 However, as already shown, the bur-
den involved in a facial analysis versus that involved in a contextual
investigation of the same ad is not as disparate as the court rea-
soned.108 Because the reasonableness of the risk created by publish-
ing the ad will most likely be determined by the jury on an ad hoc
basis, a publisher must still enjoy a sufficient degree of clairvoyance
to accurately divine which advertisements will be interpreted on
their face as criminal solicitations.
In Time v. Hill,' the Supreme Court realized that the unpredict-
ability of juries in tort suits translates into an implicitly greater bur-
den on publishers in avoiding liability:
We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service of
a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the impossible
burden of ... guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps
taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or
portrait."10
Though the Court in Time was grappling with a falsity issue not
present in Braun, the underestimation of the defendant's duty when
faced with a potential jury determination carries the same warning
to the publisher in both cases: even minimal duties involve tremen-
dous risks of future liability. Thus, the Supreme Court's reasoning
drastically undercut the distinction drawn by the appellate court
here between a superficial and investigatory examination.
The appellate court then distinguished Eimann based on the re-
quirement that the unreasonable risk be "clearly identifiable," lan-
guage not present in the jury instructions of the latter case."' A
1992). The appellate court reviewed the district court's risk-benefit analysis de novo. Id.
at 1114.
106. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
107. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116.
108. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
109. 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (refusing to hold publisher liable for nondefamatory,
negligent misstatement of fact).
110. Id. at 389.
111. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116.
change in semantics alone, however, does not reduce the danger of
subjecting SOF to an undue burden, per se. The publisher is still
forced to second-guess the jury regarding the interpretation of the
criminal risk, whether the risk is obvious enough to be clearly identi-
fied, and whether the risk is unreasonable. The distinction made is
misleading, largely due to the foreseeability problem involved when
harm results from the actions of a third party."' In fact, the court's
search for a clearly identifiable unreasonable risk in the Savage ad
illustrates the shortcomings of this "modified" standard.
For example, the appellate court held that though the ad in
Eimann was "facially innocuous" and "ambiguous in its message,"
Savage's advertisement in Braun "clearly conveyed that the adver-
tiser was 'ready, willing and able' to use his gun to commit
crimes." ' 3 The appellate court reasoned, therefore, that the unrea-
sonable risk created by Savage's advertisement was more "clearly
identifiable." Yet the conclusion reached stems from an imaginative,
result-oriented interpretation of Savage's ad. The court emphasized
the ad's use of "sinister terms," like "confidential and 'very pri-
vate,"' and then interpreted that language to reveal Savage's disposi-
tion towards any employment "requiring the use of a gun. 114
Furthermore, the court found the fact that "the list of legitimate
jobs-i.e., body guard and courier-[was] followed by 'other special
skills' and 'all jobs considered,"' clearly meant "that the advertiser
would consider illegal jobs. 11 5 Central to this logic must be the as-
sumption that Savage's ad constituted an exhaustive list of legiti-
mate jobs, such that anything following the word "courier," ipso
facto, fell into a separate category of illicit employment. Even within
the field of security, however, a wide array of employment positions
must exist, from personal protection to armored car drivers, etc.
That SOF did not require Savage to include an exclusive list of jobs
sought should hardly trigger such a presumption of illegality.
112. The appellate court even recognized the Eimann court's concern that "virtu-
ally anything might involve illegal activity." Id. (quoting Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, Inc. 880 F.2d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 1989)); "[t]he range of foreseeable misuses
of advertised products and services is as limitless as the forms and functions of the prod-
ucts themselves." Eimann, 880 F.2d at 838.
But cf. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("Our
law imposes the duty on an actor in some circumstances to foresee that the misconduct of
a third person will result in injury to another and imposes liability for failure to protect
against that risk of harm. . . .Thus, conduct may be negligent solely because the actor
should have recognized that it'would expose the person of another to an unreasonable
risk of criminal aggression.").
Foreseeability, while critical to proximate cause analysis, is sometimes cast in terms of
foreseeability of harm, thereby subsuming the issue into the duty and breach analysis.
See e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928).
113. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116 n.3 (quoting Brief for Appellees [the Brauns] at 27).
114. Id. at 1121; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
115. Id.
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The appellate court, looking for constitutional support, clung to
Gertz v. Robert Welch, in which the Supreme Court sustained a libel
suit against a newspaper for injuries "to the reputation of a private
individual," where the publisher was only negligent. 116 Because a
private individual has not chosen to enter the public eye and does not
have the access to media that public officials enjoy, he or she cannot
rebut the falsehoods as easily. Consequently, under such circum-
stances, the individual's privacy interests outweigh the rights of the
press and a civil action is justified.117 Because Gertz involved core
speech, which enjoys even greater First Amendment protection than
commercial speech, the Braun court believed that refusing to sustain
a similar action in the immediate case would effectively afford adver-
tising more protection than noncommercial speech.
Importantly, Gertz involved a case of defamatory falsehoods." 8 In
Braun, however, plaintiffs' cause of action sounded in negligence, not
defamation, and thus sought to protect substantially different inter-
ests than those addressed in a libel suit. The plaintiffs' reputation is
generally not an issue in a negligence suit, nor is the accuracy of the
advertisement. Thus, the policies underlying a defamation suit find
little application in a tort action where, as in Braun, the "victims"
were not singled out by the magazine in any way, were not the
targets of any false or damaging accusations, or denied any mean-
ingful access to the media.
Moreover, constitutional interests in a free press find greater rec-
ognition where the nature of the published information reveals, not
personal information about an individual's private life, but public in-
formation regarding a personal service. Like the pharmacists in Vir-
ginia State Board, the advertiser seeks to inform the public that he
has "X" to sell at "Y" price. In this context, the Supreme Court has
struggled to insure that the press receives protection commensurate
with the important role commercial speech plays in our free market
society." 9 Because Savage's ad clearly falls into this category of
speech, SOF's interest, as a disseminator of public information, takes
on greater importance and tips the scales towards First Amendment
protection. 20 This is particularly true, as the court noted, in the con-
text of publisher liability, when the magazine's comparative lack of
116. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
117. Id. at 323-24.
118. Id. at 346.
119. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La.
economic incentive actually heightens the dangers of chilling pro-
tected speech. 12 1 The appellate court's reliance on Gertz, therefore,
appears misplaced because the safety interests and the kind of
speech involved in Braun differ substantially from those factors that
weighed in favor of compensating the plaintiff in Gertz.'22
The only risk clearly identifiable here is the one taken by the ap-
pellate court. In justifying the constitutionality of its decision
through application of a "modified" negligence test, the majority ap-
pears to have engaged in the very type of contextual analysis it pur-
ported to reject. Indeed, the court affirmed a nearly $4,500,000
award based on little more than innuendo and the "sinister" syntax
of Savage's ad.
In his dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Eschbach clearly recognized
the danger of such a result-oriented approach and explicitly cau-
tioned that "the language of [Savage's] advertisement is ambiguous,
rather than patently criminal as the majority believes."'12 3 The very
fact that the ad leaves a different impression on two different judges,
even by itself, severely undercuts the purported "clarity" of the risk
alleged. If a court, even with the benefit of hindsight, cannot inter-
pret the language of the advertisement in one, consistent, unanimous
manner, a publisher, without such hindsight, surely faces a difficult
task in weeding-out the "dangerous" ads in the face of such a sub-
jective standard. In light of the critical First Amendment issues in-
volved, therefore, the presence of ambiguity commands judicial
restraint and liability should not have been imposed on SOF.
V. CONCLUSION
Advertising plays a key role in a free market economy so inun-
dated by the mass media. Dissemination of commercial information
fosters consumption, bargaining, enlightenment, well-informed allo-
cations of funds, and responsible decision making. Not surprisingly,
then, the Supreme Court has proclaimed that commercial speech de-
serves a substantial degree of First Amendment protection. Thus,
early decisions attempted to delineate the state's regulatory power to
1987) ("Quite simply, courts have placed more value on the societal benefits of informa-
tion availability than on the rights of private persons who claim to have been harmed.").
121. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1117-18 (lth
Cir. 1992); see also Firenze, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
122. But see Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1028 (5th Cir.
1987) ("The interest in protecting life is recognized specifically for first amendment pur-
poses and, analytically, can be no less important than the interest in reputation.").
123. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1122. As the Eimann court recognized, "in the constitu-
tional arena we have noted that the possibility of illegal results does not necessarily strip
an ad of its commercial speech protection." Thus, any doubts should be resolved in favor
of free expression.
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insure that free expression would not be unduly restrained. Such pro-
tection really promises very little, however, if First Amendment safe-
guards do not insulate the publisher on both sides, such that
expression of "unregulated" commercial speech may fall subject to
the curbing force of civil liability. In this light, extending a negli-
gence action against the publisher for harm caused by the criminal
acts of a third party marks a substantial retreat from constitutional
guarantees previously thought virtually unassailable.
The appellate court's decision risks in long-reaching effect what it
lacks in reason: a completely result-oriented manipulation of First
Amendment case law, buttressed with a strained attempt to translate
diction, type face, and punctuation into criminal intent. The arbi-
trariness of the court's interpretation of the ad and the degree of
insinuation required to find liability belie the constitutional sound-
ness of the so-called "modified" negligence test. Though the test al-
legedly eases the burden on publishers by looking only to the risks
created on the face of the advertisement, the court, perhaps unable
to justify its decision so superficially, clearly engages in a subtextual
analysis. What the court labels as a mere facial examination thus
requires the publisher to exhaust an unacceptable amount of re-
sources to avoid the possibility of being sued by a victim he cannot
foresee, praying for an amount he may not have, and awarded by a
jury whose assessments he cannot predict. Publishers cannot be sad-
dled with such a demanding burden absent any compelling rationale
for such a frontal assault on free expression.
The chilling impact that this multi-million dollar judgment could
wreak on commercial speech alone is staggering. This decision could
possibly force publishers to insure against tort claims for defective
products, bad services, or third-party criminal acts. The threat of
looming liability could also destroy newspapers and magazines alike,
close down open channels of communication, wipe out the diverse
spectrum of published material available to the public, and even si-
lence political speakers unable to find an effective conduit to reach
the masses. Though the state has a legitimate interest in safeguard-
ing the public, and though the Braun children deserve compensation,
the First Amendment necessitates that other, less intrusive solutions
be explored. Slicing the magazine's jugular merely sacrifices an in-
valuable forum for a quick fix.
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